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Abstract
We examine the impact of Federal Reserve stress tests from 2009 to 2016 on U.S. bank liquidity
creation. Empirical results show that regulatory stress tests have a negative effect on both on-
and off-balance sheet bank liquidity creation and asset-side liquidity creation. As banks enter
the stress tests, they reduce their liquidity creation to avoid failing the stress tests. These results
are consistent with the hypothesis that banks manage their risk exposures to meet higher capital
requirements. The negative effect of stress testing on liquidity creation continues to persist in the
quarters after the stress tests. Finally, stress test banks appear to increase liability-side liquidity
creation. These findings highlight that the enhanced financial stability from greater regulatory
scrutiny may be achieved at the expense of financial intermediation.
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1 Introduction
Bank capital acts as a buffer to absorb losses and is particularly important for financial stability
in periods of adverse economic conditions. Insufficient bank capital levels in the banking system
hinder its ability to create liquidity and support economic growth. For this reason, stress tests
aiming at evaluating the resilience of the banking system under adverse economic shocks are a
very important component of the regulatory framework in the banking systems worldwide. The
objective of stress tests is therefore to ensure that banks hold – at all times – an adequate amount
of capital to withstand such shocks and sustain their credit supply. This is important because recent
contributions have shown that the costs of bank bailouts are very large.1
In late February 2009, the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) was launched to
measure the ability of the 19 largest U.S. financial institutions to withstand future economic crises.
These were domestic bank holding companies (BHCs) with year-end 2008 assets exceeding $100
billion. Since 2011, the Federal Reserve has conducted the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and
Review (CCAR). From 2014, the stress testing exercise has been expanded to include all BHCs with
total assets exceeding $50 billion.
Annual stress tests have been shown to lead to changes in the risk management practices of
BHCs (Acharya et al. 2018, Cornett et al. 2018). Participating banks tend to avoid investments
that require high capital buffer according to the stress tests. To maximize the probability of passing
the tests, these banks have the incentive to align their internal risk evaluation processes with the
stress tests’ criteria. Since stress tests take a more forward-looking perspective when evaluating
bank risk, the annual implementation of stress tests should improve the supervision of bank capital.
Nevertheless, there are concerns that stress tests might lead to constraints on the ability of banks
to create liquidity – an essential function of banks (Diamond & Dybvig 1983).
In this paper, we are the first to provide empirical evidence on the impact of stress tests (SCAP
and CCAR) on the liquidity creation of U.S. banks. We focus on liquidity creation because, alongside
risk transformation (Bhattacharya & Thakor 1993, Diamond & Rajan 2001), it is one of the key
functions of banks, which supports the economy (Berger et al. 2016, Huang et al. 2018). Liquidity
is created when banks transform relatively liquid liabilities (e.g., demand deposits) into relatively
illiquid assets (e.g., corporate loans). Liquidity can also be created off the balance sheet, as is the
1For example, Veronesi & Zingales (2010) estimate that the cost for taxpayers of the Treasury-Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation joint plan in 2008 was between $21 billion and $44 billion, and Cardillo et al. (2020) report that
from 2008 to 2017 the governments of EU-15 countries spent 793 billion euros for recapitalizations of distressed banks.
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case when banks extend loan commitments or lines of credits to businesses. Liquidity creation is
a better measure of bank output than bank loans because it considers not only bank assets (in
particular, loans), but also off-balance sheet activities, demand deposits, equity, and other bank
liabilities (Berger & Sedunov 2017). By creating liquidity, banks promote economic growth and
improve capital allocation in the financial system.
Existing literature suggests that capital support and government interventions affect bank
liquidity creation (Berger et al. 2016), while stress tests lead to a reduction in credit supply of U.S.
banks (Acharya et al. 2018). These studies suggest that government intervention and stress tests
may reduce liquidity creation by banks. However, at present, there is no empirical work on the
effect of stress tests on bank liquidity creation. This is the question that this paper aims to answer
empirically. We employ a regression discontinuity approach that relies on the Federal Reserve’s
selection criterion to include banks in the stress tests as an exogenous source of variation and provide
evidence that regulatory stress tests reduce banks’ liquidity creation both on- and off-balance sheets.
A test for the continuity of the density of the distance between the bank size and the threshold,
which is the running variable in our regression discontinuity method, suggests that banks do not
manipulate their balance sheets to avoid being included in the stress tests. We acknowledge that it is
difficult to precisely gauge the impact of Federal Reserve stress tests on U.S. bank liquidity creation
because so many government intervention programs, regulatory/policy actions, and financial market
events occurred around the same time. Even so, we argue that our empirical design and additional
robustness tests help mitigate some of the concerns.
Our main findings are as follows. First, consistent with the risk-management hypothesis discussed
in Acharya et al. (2018), our results show that banks manage their risk exposures by cutting down
the asset-side component of liquidity creation, particularly to risky borrowers, in order to meet the
higher capital standards of the stress tests. Second, we document an increase in the liability-side
liquidity creation. However, the result does not suggest that banks become riskier following the
stress tests as customer savings deposits make up around 70–80% of the total liquid liabilities of
stress test banks. Therefore, this result indicates that stress tests encourage banks to adopt a
more stable funding structure. This happens plausibly because banks have an incentive to rely
on more liquid and relatively cheaper funding sources to increase their profits as a consequence of
the decrease in asset-side liquidity creation. Third, stress test banks are found to reduce liquidity
creation as they enter the stress tests for the first time, and in the quarters when the stress tests
start, to avoid failing the tests. For some components of liquidity creation, such behavior becomes
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even more pronounced in subsequent quarters.
We perform a number of robustness checks. First, we conduct the parallel trends test for the
differences in the liquidity creation growth rate of stress test banks vis-à-vis non-stress test banks in
the quarters prior to the stress tests. Second, we present the estimates of regression discontinuity
under the local randomization inference, which is based on a ‘stronger’ alternative identification
assumption. Third, we perform placebo tests by employing alternative cutoff values of $40, $60, $70,
$80, $90, and $110 billion in total assets as the criterion for BHCs to be included in the stress tests.
Fourth, we include in our sample BHCs with foreign parents and those with total assets exceeding
$10 billion. Our empirical results remain robust to these additional checks.
Our paper contributes to two strands of literature: the literature on bank liquidity creation
and the literature on the impact of stress tests on bank conduct. Motivated by the work of Berger
& Bouwman (2009), recent studies have investigated the relationship between liquidity creation
and the following variables: regulatory capital (e.g., Casu et al. 2019, Fu et al. 2016, Fungáčová
et al. 2017, Horvath et al. 2014, Tran et al. 2016), competition (e.g., Horvath et al. 2016, Jiang et al.
2019), corporate governance (e.g., Andreou et al. 2016, Diaz & Huang 2017, Huang et al. 2018),
monetary policy (e.g., Berger & Bouwman 2017), enforcement actions (e.g., Danisewicz et al. 2018),
and real economic output (e.g., Berger & Sedunov 2017). Moreover, Bowe et al. (2019) investigate
the impact of capital requirement reforms (incorporated in the Third Basel Capital Accord), the
Troubled Asset Relief Program, and unconventional monetary policy on bank liquidity creation.
The strand of literature on regulatory stress tests has investigated the impact of stress tests on
banks’ lending and risk exposure (Acharya et al. 2018), and banks’ capital and dividend payouts
(Cornett et al. 2018). However, despite the important implications of regulatory stress tests on
banks’ business practices, to the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical study documenting
the impact of stress tests on U.S. bank liquidity creation.
Our empirical findings indicate that there might be a trade-off between the positive effects of
stress tests, in terms of enhanced long-term financial stability, and the temporary negative effects
on liquidity creation. This finding is important because Berger & Sedunov (2017) find that there is
a positive relation between bank liquidity creation and real economic output. Thus, our findings
have important implications for policy makers and bank regulators, given that stress tests might
temporarily have an unintended adverse impact on the real economy. In this respect, our study is
similar to the recent paper by Danisewicz et al. (2018), which reports a reduction in bank liquidity
creation in response to regulatory enforcement actions, which ultimately leads to temporary adverse
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effects on local economic growth.2 In addition to stress tests and enforcement actions, changes in
regulatory requirements can influence the real economy via the lending channel. For example, Bindal
et al. (2019) suggest that the size-based regulatory thresholds introduced by the Dodd-Frank Act of
2010 have had an impact on small-business lending and, ultimately, the real economy. Importantly,
our empirical findings do not imply that stress tests should be avoided. In the long-term, the
improved stability in the financial system arising from stress test exercises might offset the temporary
economic costs resulting from a reduction in liquidity creation by banks.
An additional contribution of this paper to the literature on the impact of stress tests on
bank conduct is the extended sample period. While previous empirical studies focus solely on the
first stress test (e.g., Connolly 2018) or extend the analysis to include the 2014 stress test (e.g.,
Acharya et al. 2018, Shahhosseini 2015), our paper covers more recent stress tests in 2015 and 2016.
Moreover, Acharya et al. (2018) and Connolly (2018) examine the lending implications after the
implementation of the stress tests, whereas our paper explores the response of banks as they enter
the stress tests. Finally, our research goes beyond the empirical analyses conducted by Acharya
et al. (2018) and Connolly (2018), because not only do we consider bank lending, we also investigate
the impact of stress tests on bank liquidity creation on both sides of the balance sheet (assets and
liabilities) as well as liquidity creation originated by off-the-balance sheet items.
From a policy viewpoint, this paper suggests that, in the short-term, stress tests may be
detrimental to financial intermediation. Our findings, however, also show that banks tend to increase
liquidity creation on the liability-side in response to the stress tests. Since liquid liabilities consist
mainly of customer deposits, our results indicate that banks may shift to a more stable funding
structure as a result of stress tests. This finding is very important because literature on the impact
of stress tests has so far neglected the liability-side of banks’ balance sheets.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on regulatory
stress testing. Section 3 offers a literature review on regulatory stress testing. Section 4 introduces
the data and the variables of interest. Section 5 discusses the methodology, the empirical results,
and the findings. Section 6 presents the study summary and provides policy implications.
2Recent contributions also investigate the potential impact of enforcement actions on the syndicated loans’ market
and mergers and acquisitions in the banking industry. See, for example, Delis et al. (2020), Papadimitri et al. (2019).
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2 Institutional background
Stress testing of large and systemically important financial institutions is one of the main
prudential tools for enhanced supervision in the post-crisis regulatory reforms, many of which came
from the passage of the well-known Dodd-Frank Act (DFA). After the financial crisis of 2007–2009,
the U.S. banking system suffered from low capital positions and substantial risk exposures due
to deteriorating macroeconomic conditions. In 2010, the DFA required that all BHCs with total
consolidated assets exceeding $50 billion and non-bank financial institutions that are deemed
systemically important by the Financial Stability Oversight Council be subject to the annual stress
tests conducted by the Federal Reserve. Supervisory stress tests involve estimation of banks’ expected
capital levels according to their fundamentals under the baseline and various adverse economic
scenarios (Hirtle & Lehnert 2015), while allowing for simultaneous assessment and comparison of
exposures across banks (Hirtle et al. 2009). The results are then disclosed to the public and banks
that fail the stress tests are subject to corrective actions.
The first stress test under the SCAP was launched by the Federal Reserve System in 2009 in
response to the 2007–2009 financial crisis. The SCAP is a forward-looking exercise, which departs
from traditional supervisory exercises based on backward-looking information. The purpose of the
SCAP is to assess additional capital buffer that is deemed necessary to maintain credit supply under
deteriorating economic conditions. All BHCs with assets exceeding $100 billion were subject to
the stress test. Their revenues, expenses, losses, and capital ratios were projected under several
economic scenarios. The outcomes of the stress test were disclosed to the public in May 2009.
These include BHCs’ Tier 1 capital, Tier 1 common capital and risk-weighted assets as of year-end
2008. Then, the capital levels for year-end 2010 were estimated on the basis of projections of banks’
fundamentals under adverse scenarios.3 The BHCs involved in the stress test were expected to have
the Tier 1 risk-based capital and the Tier 1 common capital ratios at the end of 2010 above the
supervisory benchmarks of 6% and 4%, respectively. The required SCAP additional capital buffer,
which is the difference between the supervisory capital benchmark and the capital level estimated
under the adverse scenario, was also included in the public release.
The results of the SCAP suggested that the aggregate capital needed for the 19 BHCs to
meet the SCAP requirements was $185 billion, the majority of which was in the form of Tier 1
common capital. The aggregate supplemental capital needs were $75 billion after adjusting for the
3 Such banks’ fundamentals comprise the following variables: pre-provision net revenues, losses on different loan
categories, securities and trading positions, and allowance for loan and lease losses for 2009 and 2010.
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operating performance of the first quarter of 2009 for ten BHCs that were deemed insufficiently
capitalized. Banks with an insufficient capital buffer were required to submit plans, which include
details regarding how the capital buffer gap problem would be addressed. Nine out of ten BHCs
that failed the stress test subsequently managed to raise sufficient capital privately. The substantial
recapitalization of BHCs following the SCAP was widely regarded as a success of post-crisis regulatory
actions in improving financial health of the U.S. banking system.
From 2011, the Federal Reserve started conducting the annual CCAR for the same BHCs that
participated in the SCAP with an aim to determine if large U.S. banks had sufficient capital to
withstand negative economic shocks and maintained credit lending under adverse conditions. From
2014, the stress test expanded to all BHCs with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or more.
The CCAR requires participating BHCs to submit their internal stress test results and capital
plans. The BHCs also go through a qualitative review of their risk management and internal capital
planning processes. The quantitative assessment of CCAR requires that BHCs’ capital ratios must
be maintained at or above the regulatory levels. The capital plans of BHCs submitted to the
authority describe details of their capital adequacy assessing processes, intended capital actions and
distributions (e.g., dividend payments, capital issuances, and repurchases) for the next nine quarters.
With BHCs’ planned capital actions, the Federal Reserve System carries out the stress tests to
project revenues, expenses, losses, and post-stress capital ratios for each bank under the three defined
scenarios (i.e., ‘baseline’, ‘adverse’, and ‘severely adverse’). The scenarios place more emphasis on
the system-wide rather than the idiosyncratic risks of banks with an aim to reduce the likelihood of
banks collectively facing constraints on capital under severe economic conditions. The ability of
banks to maintain the post-stress capital ratios above the regulatory requirements is assessed by the
Federal Reserve. The outcome of the CCAR is determined by the Federal Reserve System, taking
into consideration the stress test results and the qualitative assessments of the banks’ capital plans.
In the CCAR, the Federal Reserve can object to a bank’s capital plan and distributions on either
quantitative or qualitative grounds or both. The objection of the plan may lead to restrictions in
the distributions of bank capital, such as share repurchases or dividend payments.
Overall, the purpose of stress testing exercises is to provide a comprehensive assessment of capital
adequacy and incentives for banks to undertake better risk management practices. Stress tests also
take into account macroprudential risks in the assessment of bank capital positions, which depart
from traditional supervision and regulation practices that involve setting capital rules that place
more emphasis on bank idiosyncratic risks. By requiring banks to operate with sufficient capital
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buffers so that their financial intermediation function in stressed economic scenarios is maintained,
it is argued that stress testing promotes the resilience of BHCs and reduces the systemic risk of the
entire financial system in U.S.
3 Literature review and hypothesis development
3.1 Literature on stress testing models
The literature on stress tests is relatively new and still growing. Several recent papers highlight
the importance of stress tests as a supervisory tool and evaluate the costs and benefits of different
design choices (see, for example, Hirtle & Lehnert 2015, Schuermann 2014, and references therein).
Other studies attempt to develop alternative models and approaches to carry out stress tests (see,
among others, Acharya, Engle & Pierret 2014, Covas, Rump & Zakrajsek 2014, Kapinos & Mitnik
2016, Kupiec 2018). Recent theoretical contributions focus on how stress tests can affect bank
lending (Shapiro & Zeng 2018) and how to develop an optimal disclosure policy for the stress test
results (Leitner & Williams 2018). The latter topic is very important because of a debate on whether
disclosing the results of stress tests enhances financial stability. For example, while Goldstein &
Sapra (2014) argue that disclosure of the stress test results promotes financial stability but may
worsen inefficiencies of individual banks. In this regard, Corona et al. (2017) suggest that it may
lead to excessive bank risk-taking and an increase in bank failures.
3.2 Stress tests and market implications
Recent empirical research on the impact of stress tests mostly relies on event studies to investigate
the information content of stress tests and their financial market implications. Studying the events
related to the SCAP, Morgan et al. (2014) show that stress test banks with larger capital deficiencies
experience more negative abnormal returns. Fernandes et al. (2017) examine the price and trade
reactions around the stress tests and document positive market reactions to the test announcements.
Similarly, Flannery et al. (2017) find that stress tests provide information not only about the
participating BHCs but also the fundamentals of the banking industry. Studies using data on
European banks also confirm that stress tests offer valuable information to market participants
(Petrella & Resti 2013) and may help the market detect fragile banks (Carboni et al. 2017).4 Finally,
4 However, these findings are at odds with the results provided by Lazzari et al. (2017).
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several recent studies focus on the potential spillover effects of the release of the stress test results –
either to other banks or to sovereigns (Breckenfelder & Schwaab 2018, Goncharenko et al. 2018).
3.3 Stress tests, bank capital and lending
As the consequence of failing stress tests can be severe, stress tests are likely to influence the
behavior of participating banks. An emerging strand of literature attempts to quantify the effects of
stress tests on bank credit provision and loan pricing (Acharya et al. 2018, Berrospide & Edge 2019,
Calem et al. 2019, Connolly 2018, Cortés et al. 2019, Lambertini & Mukherjee 2016), capital ratios
(Cornett et al. 2018), loan loss provisions and non-performing loans (Shahhosseini 2015), risk taking
(Pierret & Steri 2018), and entrepreneurship and innovation (Doerr 2019). Other studies (see Bindal,
Bouwman, Hu & Johnson 2019, Bordo & Duca 2018, Bouwman, Hu & Johnson 2018, Kovner &
Van Tassel 2018) focus on the impact of the DFA on banks conduct, merger and acquisition behavior,
and lending and the cost of capital. Studies focusing on European banks find that anticipation of
stress tests can lead banks to reduce their risk-weighted assets instead of raising their levels of equity
to increase capital ratios (Eber & Minoiu 2017, Gropp et al. 2018). A summary of the literature
documenting the effects of stress tests on banks’ behavior is given in Table A1 of the Appendix.
3.4 Hypotheses development: Impact of stress tests on bank liquidity creation
Banks that participate in the stress tests are required to have more capital relative to their credit
risk exposure. Higher capital ratios can be achieved by reducing credit supply and substituting
loans with relatively safer assets such as Treasury securities, especially when raising capital is costly
(Acharya et al. 2018, Berger & Udell 1994, Brinkmann & Horvitz 1995, Thakor 1996). Higher capital
ratios induced by the stress tests can also affect bank lending through other channels. Thakor
(1996), among others, maintains that tighter capital requirement leads to increased banks’ funding
costs. Higher capital reduces creditors’ risk which could result in weakened market discipline,
reduced monitoring incentive, and increased costs of funding (Calomiris & Kahn 1991). With
limited ability to pass these costs to borrowers due to competition, lending becomes less attractive
to banks. For this reason, tighter capital requirements result in credit contractions. Supporting this
view, De Jonghe et al. (2020) find evidence that higher capital requirements correspond to lower
credit supply to firms and this credit contraction largely affects risky borrowers. Furthermore, as
stress test banks are required to hold more capital against their risky lending, they may reduce
moral hazard, induced by limited liability or government protection/guarantee, by restricting credit
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supply to risky borrowers (Acharya et al. 2016, Berger & Bouwman 2013). In other words, the
risk-management hypothesis predicts that the higher capital requirement of the stress tests may lead
to the adjustment of banks’ portfolios that involves reductions in lending activities – particularly to
risky borrowers (Acharya et al. 2018). Since credit lending is a key component of liquidity creation,
bank liquidity creation declines as a result.
On the other hand, the moral hazard hypothesis suggests that requiring certain BHCs to
participate in the stress tests may increase the moral hazard incentives of banks to take on more
credit risk as these BHCs may be deemed systemically important to maintain a healthy banking
industry (Acharya et al. 2018). Also, stress test banks may have lower returns as a result of
increased capital and may engage in reaching-for-yield behavior by expanding credit lending to
riskier borrowers (Acharya et al. 2018). Furthermore, it is argued that as capital enhances banks’
safety and resilience, higher capital buffers as a consequence of the new regulatory framework are
likely to improve their ability to expand credit provision (Berger & Udell 1994, Berger & Bouwman
2009, Bhattacharya & Thakor 1993, Coval & Thakor 2005). In a recent paper, Bahaj & Malherbe
(2018) predict that the positive relationship between capital requirements and provision of credit is
more likely at high levels of capital where banks have a low probability of failure. Although higher
capital requirement reduces the value of implicit subsidy from a government guarantee, the extent to
which the marginal loan is subsidized can increase, which leads to a lower marginal funding cost and
increased bank credit lending. Similarly, higher capital can reduce banks’ costs of funding, especially
wholesale funding which is more sensitive to banks’ risk (Berger & Bouwman 2013), improve banks’
access to the risky debt markets (Carlson et al. 2013), thereby increasing the provision of credit
(Chu et al. 2019). Higher capital can also strengthen market discipline, providing stronger incentives
for banks to monitor borrowers (Mehran & Thakor 2011). These lead to improved credit access for
borrowers. As a consequence of increased credit provision, bank liquidity creation may increase in
response to regulatory stress tests.
Theories on the role of regulatory capital on bank liquidity creation yield conflicting predictions.
Liquidity creation can be related to regulatory capital in two opposing ways. First, according to the
‘financial fragility – crowding out’ hypothesis, the relationship between liquidity creation and capital
is negative. As banks gather funds from depositors to issue loans, they are inherently fragile, because
they are exposed to the risk of bank runs in the absence of complete deposit insurance (Diamond
& Rajan 2000, 2001). With the informational advantage obtained from monitoring borrowers,
the bank may extract rents from depositors, withhold monitoring or repayment collection efforts.
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Given the agency problem between the bank and depositors, depositors may be reluctant to provide
funds. Therefore, such fragility is necessary because threats of premature withdrawal of demand
deposits act as a disciplinary device (Calomiris & Kahn 1991). This fragility commits the banks
to monitor borrowers and collect repayments, allowing them to create liquidity by granting more
loans with more deposits. Because a higher capital ratio reduces the probability of financial distress,
regulators can impose capital requirements to reduce fragility in the banking system. However,
capital requirements, if binding, force banks to shift from deposit holdings to equity (Gorton &
Winton 2000). Since deposits are liquid liabilities, liquidity creation decreases eventually.
On the contrary, the ‘risk absorption’ hypothesis points to a positive relationship between bank
capital and liquidity creation. Bank risk increases with liquidity creation because it increases
the expected loss resulting from sales of illiquid assets for liquidity reasons (see, among others,
Allen & Gale 2004, Allen & Santomero 1997). In other words, given the mismatch between liquid
liabilities and illiquid assets, the more liquidity banks create, the higher default risk they may face.
Therefore, banks’ liquidity creation increases their exposure to the risk of being unable to satisfy
unexpected liquidity demands from customers and the associated losses of liquidating illiquid assets
to meet such demands. For this reason, banks need to hold more capital to improve their solvency,
which may allow them to obtain external funding on short notice or at lower costs. In addition,
since well-capitalized banks tend to have higher risk absorption capacity, they are in a stronger
position to create liquidity (Bhattacharya & Thakor 1993, Coval & Thakor 2005, Repullo 2004, von
Thadden 2004). A recent study by Donaldson et al. (2018), which does not provide support for
either hypothesis, shows that higher capital ratios enhance bank liquidity creation.
Following these two competing theories, regulatory stress tests may either increase or reduce
bank liquidity creation. This leads to two alternative hypotheses to be tested in this paper:
Hypothesis 1: Risk-management/crowding out hypothesis – Regulatory stress tests
have a negative impact on bank liquidity creation.
Hypothesis 2: Moral hazard/risk absorption hypothesis – Regulatory stress tests
have a positive impact on bank liquidity creation.
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4 Data and variables
4.1 Data
We collect data from a number of sources. Financial data is obtained from the Consolidated
Financial Statements for BHCs (FR-Y9C). Bank liquidity creation measures are obtained from
Christa Bouwman’s website.5 All variables are aggregated to the highest holder level. Our sample
period starts in 2007Q1 and ends in 2016Q4. The 19 BHCs considered for the SCAP are: Ally
Financial Inc, American Express Company, Bank of America Corporation, Bank of New York
Mellon Corporation, BB&T Corporation, Capital One Financial Corporation, Citigroup Inc., Fifth
Third Bancorp, Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co., KeyCorp, Metlife Inc.,
Morgan Stanley, PNC Financial Services Group Inc., Regions Financial Corporation, State Street
Corporation, Suntrust Banks Inc., U.S. Bancorp, and Wells Fargo & Company.
Metlife Inc. did not participate in the 2013 CCAR as its commercial banking division was sold
out and was not deemed a BHC in 2012. The 2014 CCAR was expanded to all BHCs with total
assets exceeding $50 billion, increasing the total number of eligible BHCs, which were subject to the
stress tests to 30. The new 12 BHCs include: BBVA Compass Bancshares Inc., BMO Financial
Corp., Comerica Incorporated, Discover Financial Services, HSBC North America Holdings Inc.,
Huntington Bancshares Incorporated, M&T Bank Corporation, Northern Trust Corporation, RBS
Citizens Financial Group Inc., Santander Holdings USA Inc., UnionBanCal Corporation, and Zions
Bancorporation. The 2015 CCAR added Deutsche Bank Trust Corporation to the list of stress test
banks. BancWest and TD Group were included in the 2016 CCAR. Metlife Inc. is removed from
the sample as it is an insurance company and not comparable to other BHCs. This study relies
on the website of the Federal Reserve’s National Information Center to identify BHCs with assets
greater than $20 billion as non-stress test banks.6 The complete list of stress test banks over the
sample period is provided in Table A2 of the Appendix.
4.2 Liquidity creation measures
Our liquidity creation measures are based on the methodology proposed by Berger & Bouwman
(2009). Specifically, liquidity creation (LC ) is defined as the ‘cat fat’ liquidity creation measure and
accounts for both on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet items, which are classified by category.




Loan items are classified by category rather than by maturity because for the construction of
liquidity creation measures, loan maturity is less important than the ability of banks to securitize
and sell loans. LC measure is further broken down into on- and off-balance sheet liquidity creation
measures as Berger & Bouwman (2009) find that, for large banks, half of the liquidity is created
off the balance sheet. We utilize LCON, which is the liquidity creation measure that only includes
on-balance sheet items and LCOFF, which is the off-balance sheet component of LC. Furthermore,
we employ LCA and LCL, which are the asset and the liability components of liquidity creation,
respectively. All the measures of liquidity creation are normalized by gross total assets, denoted by
GTA. Table A3 in the Appendix provides details of the construction of liquidity creation measures.
4.3 Control variables
To control for bank-specific characteristics, a number of bank control variables are included in the
liquidity creation regressions. One of them is the bank size (SIZE), which is the natural logarithm of
gross total assets. It is important to account for credit risk as it helps to isolate the effect of capital
on liquidity creation from the role of capital in supporting the risk transformation function of banks
(Berger & Bouwman 2009). We proxy for credit risk using the ratio of non-performing loans to total
loans (NPL) as in Du & Palia (2018). We also control for bank capitalization, denoted by CAP,
which is measured by the ratio of equity to total assets (Berger & Bouwman 2009). To account for
bank profitability, we use return on equity (ROE), which is the ratio of net income to equity (Casu
et al. 2019). In robustness checks, we further include banks with foreign parents. The information
about foreign banks can be found on the website of the Federal Reserve’s National Information
Center. The definitions of the variables used in our empirical analyses are given in Table 1.
4.4 Data description
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the liquidity creation measures as well as the control
variables of interest. The average liquidity creation, LC, appears to be 54.44%, while the averages
of LCON and LCOFF are 26.34% and 28.10%, respectively. Consistent with Berger & Bouwman
(2009), who find that for large banks half of the liquidity is created off the balance sheet, the mean
value of LCOFF in our sample is greater than that of LCON. It can be seen from Table 2 that
the average of LCL is 20.33%, which is much higher than the average of LCA (6.01%), suggesting
that the banks in our sample appear to create more liquidity on the liability side than on the asset
side of the balance sheet. As for the control variables, the average of return on equity, ROE, is
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4.39%. Table 2 also shows that the average capital ratio, CAP, of the banks over the sample period
is 10.95%, while the mean of non-performing loans to total loans ratio, NPL, is 2.36%.
Figure 1 plots the evolution of LC, over time, for the stress test banks and the non-stress test
banks. The graph shows a marked reduction in LC from around $4,300 billion in 2008:Q4 to $3,500
billion in 2009:Q4 for the stress test banks, but not for the non-stress test banks. Such a pattern,
however, is not clear in the following periods. For this reason, in the subsequent econometric analysis
we present tests that exclude the first stress testing exercise to ensure the robustness of our results.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Univariate analysis
The results of the univariate analysis for the differences in the means and the medians of the
main variables of the banks in the sample are reported in Table 3. The empirical examination
includes all stress test and non-stress test banks in sample. Following Cornett et al. (2018), we
divide our sample into three subperiods: year 2007, which is the year before the financial crisis and
before the stress testing exercises; year 2009, which is the first year of the stress testing program;
and the 2009–2016 period, which includes data for the full-sample. Once a BHC is classified as
a stress test bank in a particular year, its quarterly observations in that year are included in the
stress test category.
Table 3 shows that in 2007, which is the year before the stress tests, the BHCs that go into the
stress test in 2009 have higher liquidity creation ratios than non-stress test banks. For example,
the LC ratios are 92.19% for stress test banks versus 47.78% for non-stress test banks. Similarly,
LCOFF ratios are 71.07% and 17.78% for stress test banks and non-stress test banks, respectively.
This is consistent with the finding of Berger & Bouwman (2009) that large banks create more than
half of their liquidity off the balance sheet. Nevertheless, non-stress test banks as a group appear to
have a higher average LCON ratio than stress test banks (29.99% versus 22.12%). Stress test banks
also have a lower average LCA ratio (7.73%) in comparison with non-stress test banks (14.7%).
In 2009, which is the first year of stress testing, non-stress test banks see no significant changes
in the liquidity creation ratios when comparing column (5) to column (1). As for stress test banks,
by comparing column (7) to column (3), it can be seen that their liquidity creation ratios have
been significantly reduced during 2007 and 2009. Notably, the mean of LC in 2007 for stress test
banks is 92.19%, which decreases to 59.61% in 2009. Similarly, both LCON and LCOFF ratios also
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decrease from 21.12% to 14.49% and from 71.07% to 45.12%, respectively, and both are statistically
significant at the 10% and the 5% levels, respectively. Stress test banks appear to cut down their
asset-side liquidity creation, LCA, from 7.73% in 2007 to 1.14% in 2009. The difference between the
two estimates is statistically significant at the 5% level.
Comparing the results for 2007 (column (1)) and the period between 2009 and 2016 (column (9)),
there are no significant changes in the total liquidity creation ratio, LC, for non-stress test banks,
while there is a marginal increase in the liquidity creation on the balance sheet, LCON (34.69%
versus 29.99%). In contrast, when comparing column (11) to column (3), stress test banks appear to
have a lower liquidity creation, LC, on average during 2009–2016, decreasing from 92.19% in 2007 to
51.81%. The LCOFF ratio also falls from 71.07% in 2007 to 33.14% (also statistically different at the
1% significance level). Similarly, there is a decrease in the asset-side liquidity creation, LCA, to 0.1%
in 2009–2016 (also statistically different at the 1% significance level). However, the liability-side
liquidity creation, LCL, appears to increase during 2009–2016 to 18.57% in comparison with 13.38%
in 2007 (again, statistically different at the 1% significance level). Overall, it appears that stress
test banks reduce their liquidity creation as they enter the stress test, while no significant changes
are observed for non-stress test banks.
Table A4 of the Appendix further presents the univariate analysis for the differences in the
means of bank balance sheet items. When comparing columns (4) and (6) to column (2), the results
suggest that stress test banks reduce illiquid assets following the stress tests. For example, in
2009 and during the 2009–2016 period, the ratios of commercial real estate loans, loans to finance
agricultural production, commercial and industrial loans, and intangible assets and premises are
smaller than those in 2007. The table also shows an increase in saving deposits ratio of stress test
banks after the stress tests. As saving deposits are more liquid and tend to account for a large
proportion of banks’ total liquid liabilities, the finding is consistent with the reported increase in
stress test banks’ LCL. Finally, by comparing column (6) to column (2), there is evidence that stress
test banks reduce illiquid off-balance sheet items (e.g., unused commitments, net standby letters of
credit, and commercial and similar letters of credit), while increase more liquid components (e.g.,
interest rate derivatives and foreign exchange derivatives) following the stress tests.
5.2 Regression discontinuity design
We exploit the Federal Reserve System’s selection criterion for the stress tests as an exogenous
source of variation to estimate the causal impact of stress tests on bank liquidity creation. Banks are
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selected on the basis of their size, and therefore stress test banks do not have counterparts that are
not part of the stress test (Acharya et al. 2018, Cornett et al. 2018). In other words, the treatment
status, which is conditional on bank size, is not driven by the outcome variables. This set-up allows
us to employ a regression discontinuity (RD) approach to investigate the effect of regulatory stress
tests on bank liquidity creation. The RD setting requires a known cutoff of a running variable in
order to determine the treatment. The regulatory rule that obligates certain banks to participate in
the stress tests provides a natural threshold and allows us to exploit the cross-sectional variation in
the liquidity creation of stress test banks and non-stress test banks. The BHCs with total assets
below the threshold fall naturally into the control group, while the treatment group consists of
BHCs with total assets exceeding the threshold and therefore are subject to regulator stress tests.
The RD method focuses on the treatment effect induced by the variation in the treatment
assignment around the cutoff and overcomes the effects of other potential confounders. The average
effect of the treatment on banks that are close to the cutoff can be obtained by comparing the
average outcomes of observations just below and above the threshold.7 That is, the liquidity creation
of banks just above the size cutoff subsequent to entering the stress tests is compared to the liquidity
creation of banks that are exempt from the tests. In the absence of treatment, banks belonging to
the treatment and the control groups are assumed to behave in a similar way. The identification
strategy assumes that the assignment/running variable cannot be manipulated around the known
threshold (see Lee & Lemieux 2010). In other words, the validity of our RD estimation method
rests on the assumption that banks do not have control over whether they are over the size limits or
not, which in turn, determines whether or not they are subject to the stress tests.8
In this paper, the local linear regression discontinuity is estimated non-parametrically, following
Hahn et al. (2001), using the data closer to the cutoffs of $100 billion and $50 billion. The use of
non-parametric approach is to mitigate the risk of misspecification, which is common in parametric
analysis. The empirical approach is appealing as it reduces the bias arising from using the data
farther away from the cutoff to estimate the discontinuity at the cutoff and the variation in the
liquidity creation of banks near the size limits is attributable to the effect of the stress tests. The
7 Cornett et al. (2018) also use a RD approach to examine bank behavior around Federal Reserve stress tests.
8 The first round of the stress tests was announced and conducted in 2009. Participated banks were those whose
total assets exceed $100 billion in 2008. The $100 billion and the $50 billion size requirements in 2009 and in 2014,
respectively, were determined by the Federal Reserve System rather than BHCs. Therefore, it can be argued that
banks had no control over whether it is in or out of the stress test group.
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regression takes the following specification (see Lee & Lemieux 2010, Roberts & Whited 2013):
Yit = α+ β1Stressit + β2Assignmentit + β3(Stressit × Assignmentit) + δXit + υi + γt + εit, (1)
where Yit is a proxy for bank liquidity creation for bank i at time t. The dummy variable, Stressit ,
defines the treatment status and equals 1 if a bank is in the stress test group and 0 otherwise. As
there was no stress test in 2010, Stressit takes the value of 0 for all banks in that year. The variable,
Assignmentit , represents the distance between bank i’s size (natural logarithm of gross total assets)
and the cutoffs (normalized by natural logarithm). The interaction term, Stressit × Assignmentit ,
is included to capture the possible differences in the slope of the regression on both sides of the
cutoff as explained in Bonner & Eijffinger (2016). Xit is a vector of control variables, and υi and
γt represent bank fixed effects and time fixed effects, respectively.9 In our regression discontinuity
estimations, robust standard errors are clustered at the bank level. We exclude bank size, SIZE,
from the RD regressions because of its high correlation with the Assignment variable.
Choosing a bandwidth in the local linear non-parametric RD model involves a bias-variance
trade-off. On the one hand, a smaller bandwidth uses a fewer number of observations around
the cutoff, thereby reducing the potential estimator’s bias that arises from specifying an incorrect
functional form. But this comes at the expense of reduced statistical precision due to a smaller
sample size. On the other hand, a wider bandwidth employs more observations, thus improving
estimation precision at the expense of increased risk of bias. While there are a variety of approaches
for choosing the optimal bandwidth for the RD model in the literature, the selection of bandwidth
remains a subjective decision. It is, therefore, suggested that the best practice is to experiment with
different bandwidths to demonstrate the robustness of the findings (Roberts & Whited 2013). In
this paper, the RD estimation is implemented using the optimal mean squared error (MSE-optimal)
bandwidth that minimizes the mean square error following Imbens & Kalyanaraman (2012). As the
choice of weighting kernel has been shown to have negligible impact on estimation in practice, we
use the rectangular kernel as the weighting kernel.
9 Bank fixed effects are included to take into account unobserved heterogeneity across banks in our sample. In
particular, bank fixed effects wipe out unobserved time-invariant bank characteristics affecting bank liquidity creation.
The main variation across banks comes from two sources: the bank fixed effects and the effects of participating in the
stress tests. However, this is not a cause for concern as these two effects are not perfectly linearly correlated. For
example, in 2009, 2011, and 2012, the same 15 out of 34 banks did not participate in the stress tests – representing
around 44% of the sample of the stress test banks. In 2013, Metlife Inc., dropped out of the sample for the stress test
banks and was the only BHC not participating in the stress test in 2016.
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5.2.1 Graphical analysis
Figure 2 plots the discontinuity estimates at the threshold for bank liquidity creation measures.
The x-axis measures the distance between banks’ size at the cutoff. Banks with size above the cutoff
are to the right of the threshold, while those below the cutoff are to the left. The lines represent the
fitted regression lines for models, which include up to the fourth-order polynomial term. Figure 2
shows a clear discontinuity in bank liquidity creation measures at the cutoff. Specifically, within
the proximity of the cutoff, stress test banks have lower total liquidity creation ratio, LC, than
non-stress test banks. Similarly, other liquidity creation ratios (LCON, LCOFF, and LCA) of stress
test banks are also lower than those of non-stress test banks, pointing to the negative impact of
stress testing on bank liquidity creation. In contrast, the figure illustrates that the liability-side
liquidity creation ratio, LCL, of stress test banks is higher than that of non-stress test counterparts.
5.2.2 Regression discontinuity estimation
We use a RD approach that exploits the bank size cutoff and separates stress test banks from
non-stress test banks. By comparing banks around this cutoff, we can identify the effect of regulatory
stress tests on U.S. bank liquidity creation. As mentioned earlier, the RD method assumes that
banks in the vicinity of the threshold cannot manipulate the treatment status. This requires that
the density of the running variable be continuous around the threshold. We follow the methodology
proposed by McCrary (2008) to test for the discontinuity of the density of the running variable.
Figure 3 plots the density of the running variable (in our case, Assignment). The x-axis represents
the distance of banks’ size from the stress test threshold and the y-axis represents the density of
the running variable. The dots depict the density and the solid line represents the fitted density
function of the running variable with a 95% confidence interval around the fitted line. A jump in
the density at the threshold, if observed, is indicative of discontinuity and manipulations. The figure
gives little indication of a strong discontinuity at the threshold. The discontinuity estimate of the
density of the running variable is −0.1317 and is statistically insignificant at conventional levels.
Therefore, the null hypothesis that the density of Assignment at the cutoff threshold is continuous
cannot be rejected. Overall, it appears that banks do not manipulate their size with an aim to avoid
being subject to the regulator stress tests.
We resort to a non-parametric local linear estimation with a rectangular kernel and the MSE-
optimal bandwidth following Imbens & Kalyanaraman (2012). Table 4 reports the estimation
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results for the liquidity creation measures. The variable of interest is Stress, which captures the
difference between stress test and non-stress test banks. For each of the measures of bank liquidity
creation, we show the estimation results with and without control variables. We find that there is a
negative and statistically significant discontinuity at the cutoff across all the measures of liquidity
creation with the exception of the liability-side liquidity creation, LCL. For example, the estimated
coefficients of Stress for the total liquidity creation, LC, (columns (1) and (2)) are −0.1161 and
−0.1279, respectively, suggesting that banks reduce their liquidity creation when they are subject
to the regulatory stress tests. The estimated effects are significant at the 1% significance level.
Economically, the estimated coefficient of Stress in column (1) indicates that stress test banks
reduce LC on average by around 11 percentage points relative to non-stress test banks. Since the
sample mean for LC is around 54 percentage points, this reduction is around 21.4% of the sample
mean. In column (2) the estimated reduction is around 23.5% of the sample mean. Considering
the coefficient estimate of −0.6225 on Assignment and the coefficient estimate of 0.7019 on the
interaction term, Stress × Assignment, in column (1), our result suggests that the reduction in LC
actually becomes smaller as the bank becomes bigger, provided that the bank is included in the
stress tests. In particular, an increase of (−0.6225 + 0.7019) × 1.4175 = 0.1125 ≈ 11% in the value
of LC, evaluated at the sample mean, is associated with an increase of one-standard deviation in
Assignment for stress test banks. The coefficient on the interaction term is interesting because
it indicates that the impact of stress tests on LC is more pronounced for smaller banks closer to
the cutoff than bigger banks, located farther away from the size cutoff. Similarly, the coefficient
estimates of Stress for liquidity creation on the balance sheet, LCON, (columns (3) and (4)) are
−0.0853 and −0.0914 and are statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Stress also reduces bank off-balance sheet liquidity creation. Specifically, the coefficient estimates
of Stress for the liquidity creation off the balance sheet, LCOFF, (columns (5) and (6)) are −0.0362
and −0.0307, respectively (both are statistically significant at the 1% level). These results suggest
that stress test banks reduce their off-balance sheet liquidity creation in response to regulatory stress
tests, which may be due to the fact that off-balance sheet risk can materialize and contribute to the
on-balance sheet risk. This may, in turn, affect the capital ratios of those banks that participate in
the stress tests. As can be seen from Table 4, the coefficient estimates of Stress for the asset-side
liquidity creation, LCA, (columns (7) and (8)) are −0.0849 and −0.0764, respectively, both of
which are significant at the 1% significance level. These empirical findings are generally in line with
Acharya et al. (2018), who document a reduction of credit supply of banks, especially to relatively
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risky borrowers. Stress test banks may attempt to cut down their risk exposure by shrinking their
asset-side liquidity creation in an effort to increase their capital ratios. This is also consistent with
Hyun & Rhee (2011) and Gropp et al. (2018), who provide evidence that banks shrink their risky
assets instead of issuing new equity to meet higher capital requirements.
On the contrary, the coefficient estimates of Stress for the liability-side liquidity creation, LCL,
(columns (9) and (10)) are both positive (0.1090 and 0.1140, respectively) and statistically significant
at the 1% level. The results imply that banks increase their liability-side liquidity creation in
response to stress tests. Table A4 in the Appendix shows the univariate analysis of liquid and illiquid
components of both on- and off-balance sheet items of stress test and non-stress test banks. It
appears that stress test banks increase their savings deposits following the stress tests. Table A5 in
the Appendix shows that savings deposits account for a large proportion (around 70–80%) of stress
test banks’ total liquid liabilities. With a decline in liquidity mismatch as a result of the reduction
in asset-side liquidity creation, banks may rely more on stable funding sources, which leads to an
increase in liability-side liquidity creation. Furthermore, Cornett et al. (2018) report that stress test
banks increase their capital ratios to avoid failing the stress tests. With the improved capital ratios
and the reduced probability of default, banks may have incentives to increase liquidity creation on the
liability side of the balance sheet. This can subsequently lead to enhanced bank profitability, which
may compensate for the forgone profits from the reduced asset-side liquidity creation. Enhanced
profitability may also result in increased retained earnings and capital. Consistent with our results,
Berger et al. (2016) find that capital support, which improves banks’ capital ratios increases bank
liability-side liquidity creation. It should be noted that equity is also included in the calculation
of liability-side liquidity creation and the increased equity should reduce LCL. Therefore, it is not
clear whether or not banks issue more equity in response to regulatory stress tests.
Table 5 reports the RD estimation results for those banks that enter the stress tests for the first
time. In all regressions, Stress is the dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the bank is required to
participate in the stress test in a particular year but not the year before, and is equal to 0 otherwise.
Similar empirical findings are reported indicating that stress tests lead to a reduction in bank total
liquidity creation. Specifically, Table 5 presents evidence that for those banks that enter the stress
tests for the first time, they tend to cut down on asset-side liquidity creation to reduce their risk
exposure while adjusting funding activities to increase liability-side liquidity creation. Consistent
with prior empirical findings, banks’ off-balance sheet liquidity creation is also reduced in response
to regulatory stress tests. When controlling for the covariates, the estimated coefficients of Stress
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remain consistent across the model specifications. Taken together, the empirical results suggest
that regulatory stress tests have a positive or negative impact on different components of liquidity
creation, but the total effect is negative.
5.3 Bank liquidity creation when they enter the stress test for the first time
In this subsection, we investigate the change in banks’ liquidity creation as they enter the stress
tests for the first time. The following regression is estimated using the ordinary least squares (OLS).
To improve their chances of passing the stress tests, banks may manage their financial statements,
thereby changing their liquidity creation. We follow Cornett et al. (2018) and estimate:
Yit = α+ β1First Stressit + δXit + γt + εit, (2)
where Yit is the measure of bank liquidity creation for bank i at time t. The dummy variable of
interest is First Stress, which takes a value of 1 if the bank is subject to the stress test in a particular
year, but not the year before. Xit is a vector of control variables. All the variables are measured as
changes from the periods just before entering into the stress tests to the first year of stress testing.
Because the starting point of each of the stress tests is in the third quarter, the focus of the analysis
is the changes during the third quarter prior to each of the stress tests and the first year of the stress
test. The analysis allows us to identify the difference-in-difference (DiD) between stress test banks
and non-stress test banks as they enter the stress tests for the first time. In all of our regressions
for this subsection, time fixed effects are included and standard errors are double clustered by both
bank and time to control for unobserved heterogeneity within the variables.10
Table 6 presents the results from the OLS regressions of bank liquidity creation measures as
they enter the stress tests for the first time. The variable of interest is First Stress, which is equal
to 1 if the bank is subject to the stress test in a particular year but not the year before. This allows
us to examine the differences in the liquidity creation of non-stress test banks and stress test banks
as the latter enters the stress tests for the first time. All the variables are measured as changes from
quarter 3 of the year t− 1 to quarter 3 of year t as the starting point of the stress tests is quarter
3. Controlling for other bank-specific characteristics, the estimated coefficient of First Stress of
−0.0843 is statistically significant at the 5% level in the regression (1) for total liquidity creation,
10 Consistent with Cornett et al. (2018), we exclude bank fixed effects to avoid that the variation that we explore
derive solely from the banks that enter the stress test for the first time. Moreover, clustering standard errors at the
bank level only does not change qualitatively our empirical results.
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LC. This suggests that as banks participate in the stress test for the first time, they tend to alter
their behaviors and reduce their total liquidity creation from quarter 3 prior to joining the stress
test group to quarter 3 in the first year of stress testing. Similarly, in the regression for the liquidity
creation on the balance sheet, LCON, as banks enter the stress tests, there is a significant (at the 1%
level) reduction in the liquidity creation of banks on the balance sheet with an estimated coefficient
of −0.0303. Similar findings are presented in columns (3) and (4) for liquidity creation off the
balance sheet, LCOFF, and asset liquidity creation, LCA. The coefficient estimates of First Stress
are −0.0540 and −0.0232, respectively. The reduction in the asset-side liquidity creation, LCA,
that is found in the table is consistent with the risk-management hypothesis proposed by Acharya
et al. (2018). The hypothesis suggests that stress test banks manage their risk exposure more
prudently by reducing credit supply, particularly to risky borrowers to increase their capital ratios.
Furthermore, Table 6 shows that the risk-management hypothesis also applies to liquidity creation
off the balance sheet because banks adjust their off-balance sheet activities as they enter the stress
tests. Nevertheless, as for the liability-side liquidity creation, LCL, the estimated coefficient on
First Stress is statistically insignificant even though it remains negative in column (5).
Table 7 reports the results for the same regressions after excluding the first stress test. Consistent
with the results in Table 6, the results in Table 7 confirm that (with the exception of LCL) all
liquidity creation measures decrease as a result of banks entering the stress tests for the first time.
5.4 Bank liquidity creation around the stress test quarter
From 2009–2015, the starting point of the stress test is the third quarter, Q3, while the starting
point of the stress test in 2016 is the first quarter, Q1. We examine the liquidity creation of stress
test banks around the starting point of the stress tests by employing a DiD regression method
following Cornett et al. (2018). At the starting point of the stress tests (i.e., Q = t), all the variables
are measured as changes from quarter 2 to quarter 3 in 2009–2015 and from quarter 4 to quarter 1
in 2016. Similarly, we measure the changes in all the variables in the quarters before (i.e., Q = t− 2
and Q = t− 1) and after the starting point quarters (i.e., Q = t+ 1). In all regressions, the variable
Stress, which is equal to 1 if the bank participates in the stress test in a particular year and 0
otherwise, is the focus of our interest. The coefficient of the interaction between Stress and the
quarters around the starting points of the stress tests captures the behavior of stress test banks
around the stress tests. In all regressions conducted for this subsection, time fixed effects are
included and standard errors are double clustered by bank and time to control for unobserved
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heterogeneity.
In this subsection, we empirically examine the liquidity creation of banks around the stress test
starting points. Table 8 presents the regression results for changes in bank liquidity creation by
quarters around the stress test starting points. The interaction variable, Stress ×Q = t, captures
the effect of stress testing on the starting point quarters (between quarters 2 and 3 in 2009–2015,
and between quarter 4 in 2015 and quarter 1 in 2016), Stress ×Q = t+ 1 isolates the changes in
liquidity creation in the quarter after the starting points (between quarters 3 and 4 in 2009-2015,
and between quarter 1 and 2 in 2016). Stress ×Q = t− 2 and Stress ×Q = t− 1 isolate the changes
in liquidity creation two quarters and one quarter before the stress tests, respectively.
Consistent with prior empirical findings, it can be seen that the coefficient estimates of Stress ×
Q = t are negative and statistically significant for all measures of liquidity creation, except for LCL,
indicating that banks reduce their liquidity creation at the starting points of the stress tests to
improve their chances of passing the tests. The findings point to differences between stress and
non-stress test banks at the starting point of the stress tests as liquidity creation of stress test banks
is reduced in comparison with that of non-stress test banks. Specifically, the coefficient estimate of
Stress×Q = t for LC is −0.0125 and significant at the 1% significance level. The coefficient estimates
of Stress ×Q = t for LCON and LCOFF are −0.0034 and −0.0091, respectively (significant at the
1% and the 5% levels), indicating that stress testing appears to have a stronger effect on off-balance
sheet liquidity creation of banks than on-balance sheet liquidity creation. The results are consistent
with prior empirical analyses in which evidence in support of the risk-management hypothesis is
reported. Stress test banks cut down their risk exposure, thereby reducing liquidity creation both
on- and off-the-balance sheet. While the coefficient estimate for LCA is −0.0034 and significant at
the 5% level, the coefficient estimate for LCL is statistically insignificant at conventional levels. For
the quarters after the stress test starting points, Table 8 also shows that the coefficient estimates of
Stress ×Q = t+ 1 are negative and statistically significant at the 5% level for only LCON and LCA
(−0.0090 and −0.0064, respectively). Thes empirical results indicate that the impact of regulatory
stress tests on bank liquidity creation appears to be strongest at the starting quarter of the stress
tests as banks reduce their liquidity creation to improve the chances of passing the stress tests. The
impact of stress tests on liquidity creation on the quarter after the stress tests is more pronounced
but is only observed in some components of liquidity creation.
Table 9 presents the results after excluding the first stress test. The coefficient estimates on
Stress ×Q = t are slightly smaller than those reported in Table 8, but they are still negative and
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statistically significant at the 5% or 1% level for LC, LCON, and LCA.
5.5 Robustness checks
For robustness checks, we begin with testing the parallel trends assumption, which in our case
implies that in the absence of the stress tests, the trend growth rates for the liquidity creation
measures of stress test and non-stress test banks are not statistically different. Table 10 presents
t-tests for differences in mean between treatment and control groups in eight quarters prior to the
stress test following Roberts & Whited (2013). The test examines the differences in the growth rate
in liquidity creation measures between the treatment and control groups during each pre-treatment
quarter. We find that the null of equality of means cannot be rejected in 34 out of 40 cases at
conventional levels, which largely confirms the validity of the parallel trends assumption.
Next, we present the estimates of RD under the local randomization inference, which is based
on a ‘stronger’ alternative identification assumption. The local randomization assumption holds
that, within a narrow bandwidth around the threshold, observations are as good as randomly
assigned to treatment and control groups. That is, the treatment assignment could be regarded as a
randomization mechanism near the cutoff (Lee 2008). Following the procedure in Cattaneo et al.
(2015, 2016), a small neighborhood around the cutoffs where the local randomization assumption is
deemed most plausible is selected. Table 11 presents the results of the difference-in-means tests for
the measures of liquidity creation between the stress test banks and the non-stress test banks using
the randomization inference. The estimates of the treatment effects are largely consistent with our
main findings. For example, the difference in the means of LC between stress test and non-stress
test banks is statistically significant at the 1% significance level.
To test whether the actual cutoff fits the data better than other nearby cutoffs, placebo tests are
conducted to see if discontinuity in bank liquidity creation is still observed at artificially determined
thresholds. The following alternative thresholds other than $100 and $50 billion are selected: $40,
$60, $70, $80, $90, and $110 billion. Using the alternative thresholds as the artificial cutoffs, all
banks in the sample are re-assigned into the treatment or the control groups, based on whether
or not the banks’ gross total assets exceed the artificial cutoffs, respectively. Table 12 presents
the estimation results using the alternative cutoffs. Using the alternative cutoff of $40 billion, the
estimated coefficient of Stress is negative in column (3). Using the alternative cutoff of $60 billion,
even though the estimated coefficients of Stress are negative for LCA in both columns (7) and (8),
we find that the estimated coefficient is positive for LC in column (2). Overall, the results suggest
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that the treatment effect is not observed at the artificially determined thresholds in most regressions.
We perform an additional robustness check by running the RD regressions that include banks
with assets larger than $10 billion. Table 13 presents the results of RD when banks with assets
larger than $10 billion are included. Overall, the results are consistent with our main empirical
findings. Finally, we run the RD regressions and include banks with foreign parents. Table 14
presents the results of RD when banks with foreign parents are included. Collectively, we still find
that stress tests have a significantly negative impact on bank liquidity creation. Banks appear to
reduce all components of liquidity creation with the exception of liability-side liquidity creation.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we investigate the impact of Federal Reserve stress tests from 2009 to 2016 on
U.S. bank liquidity creation. To do so, we employ a regression discontinuity approach to provide
evidence that regulatory stress tests may lead to a reduction in bank liquidity creation both on and
off the balance sheet. In particular, we show that asset-side liquidity creation decreases in response
to the stress tests, a finding that is in line with the risk-management hypothesis: stress test banks
cut down credit lending, particularly to risky borrowers, to reduce their risk exposures (Acharya
et al. 2018). However, on the liability-side there is an increase of liquidity creation, driven by more
customer deposit funding. This finding suggests that banks seek to offset the increase in funding
costs resulting from the stress tests by moving from non-deposit funding to cheaper funding sources.
From a policy perspective, to the extent that stress testing discourages bank liquidity creation,
an important bank output which contributes to economic growth (Bhattacharya & Thakor 1993),
stress tests might lead to a reduction in the amount available for financing, thereby slowing economic
growth. Nevertheless, as excessive liquidity creation increases the probability of default (Imbierowicz
& Rauch 2014), which can result in financial instability and may lead to financial crises (Acharya
et al. 2011, Acharya & Naqvi 2012, Berger & Bouwman 2017), the reduction of excessive liquidity
creation as a consequence of regulatory stress tests can be socially desirable in terms of enhancing
the safety and soundness of the banking system. For these reasons, it is important for policymakers
and bank regulators to consider the trade-off between the benefits of greater financial stability and
the benefit of greater liquidity creation when designing a regulatory framework that promotes the
soundness of the banking system but also minimizes the impact on economic activity.
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Table 1: Variable definitions
Variable Notation Measure Data source
Dependent variables
Liquidity creation LC Total amount of ‘cat fat’ liquidity
creation normalized by gross total
assets. This liquidity creation mea-
sure classifies loans according to
category and includes off-balance
sheet items.
Bouwman’s website
LCON Total amount of ‘cat nonfat’ liq-
uidity creation normalized by gross
total assets. This liquidity cre-
ation measure classifies loans ac-
cording to category and excludes
off-balance sheet items.
Bouwman’s website
LCOFF Total amount of ‘fat’ liquidity cre-
ation normalized by gross total as-
sets. This measures off-balance
sheet liquidity creation.
Bouwman’s website
LCA Asset-side liquidity creation Bouwman’s website
LCL Liability-side liquidity creation Bouwman’s website
Explanatory variables
Stress Dummy taking value 1 if a bank
is in the stress test group and 0
otherwise.
Federal Reserve’s SCAP & CCAR
reports
Assignment Distance between bank size (natu-
ral logarithm of gross total assets)
and the normalized cutoffs.
FR-Y9C
Control variables
Bank size SIZE Natural logarithm of gross total as-
sets
FR-Y9C
Bank capitalization CAP Equity to total assets FR-Y9C
Return on equity ROE Net income to equity FR-Y9C




Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max Obs.
Dependent variables
LC 0.5444 0.3362 -0.2744 2.3620 1397
LCON 0.2634 0.1975 -0.4579 0.6433 1397
LCOFF 0.2810 0.3373 -0.0233 2.3704 1397
LCA 0.0601 0.1523 -0.3849 0.3851 1397
LCL 0.2033 0.1030 -0.2005 0.3945 1397
Explanatory variables
Stress 0.5175 0.4999 0.0000 1.0000 1397
Assignment 0.3732 1.4175 -1.7158 3.9424 1397
CAP 0.1095 0.0240 0.0456 0.2134 1397
NPL 0.0236 0.0209 0.0000 0.1418 1397
ROE 0.0439 0.0605 -0.5396 0.2919 1397
SIZE 18.5234 1.4072 16.7049 21.6700 1397
The table reports summary statistics of all variables for the period 2007–2016. LC is
the liquidity creation. LCON is the on-the balance sheet liquidity creation measure.
LCOFF is the off-balance sheet liquidity creation. LCA and LCL denote asset and
liability components of liquidity creation, respectively. Stress is the dummy equal to
1 if the bank is subject to the stress test and 0 otherwise. Assignment represents the
distance between bank size (natural logarithm of gross total assets) and the normalized
cutoffs. ROE is the return on equity, SIZE is the natural logarithm of gross total





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6: Changes in bank liquidity creation measures as they enter the stress tests for the first time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LC LCON LCOFF LCA LCL
First Stress -0.0843** -0.0303*** -0.0540* -0.0232*** -0.0071
(0.0398) (0.0082) (0.0320) (0.0043) (0.0103)
SIZE -0.1047 -0.1356*** 0.0309 -0.0969*** -0.0386*
(0.0673) (0.0124) (0.0634) (0.0169) (0.0198)
CAP 2.9729** -0.8411*** 3.8140*** -0.4013 -0.4398**
(1.3129) (0.3170) (1.3229) (0.2720) (0.2145)
ROE -0.0944 0.0803 -0.1747 0.0799* 0.0004
(0.1458) (0.0498) (0.1676) (0.0470) (0.0119)
NPL -1.7642 -1.2295 -0.5347 -1.1965 -0.0330
(2.2298) (1.5416) (2.6521) (1.1046) (0.6662)
Constant -0.0264 -0.0131 -0.0133 -0.0360* 0.0229**
(0.0304) (0.0289) (0.0287) (0.0197) (0.0105)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 142 142 142 142 142
Adjusted R2 0.1988 0.0753 0.2448 0.1343 0.0889
The table reports results from the ordinary least squares regressions examining the changes
of bank liquidity creation as they enter the stress test group with changes in other observable
control variables included as independent variables. All variables are measured as changes
from quarter 3 of year t−1 to quarter 3 of year t. The variable of interest is First Stress,
which is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank is subject to the stress test in a particular year but not
the year before and 0 otherwise. Time fixed effects are included in all regressions and robust
standard errors reported in parentheses are double clustered by bank and time. LC is the
liquidity creation, LCON is the on-the balance sheet liquidity creation measure, LCOFF is
the off-balance sheet liquidity creation, LCA is the asset component of liquidity creation, LCL
is the liability component of liquidity creation, SIZE is the natural logarithm of gross total
assets, CAP is the equity to total assets, ROE is the return on equity, and NPL is the total
non-performing loans to total loans. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 7: Changes in bank liquidity creation measures as they enter the stress tests for the first time
excluding the first stress test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LC LCON LCOFF LCA LCL
First Stress -0.0321*** -0.0206*** -0.0115*** -0.0290*** 0.0084***
(0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0009)
SIZE -0.1610*** -0.0844** -0.0766** -0.1344*** 0.0500**
(0.0464) (0.0408) (0.0362) (0.0329) (0.0220)
CAP -0.5232 -0.1795 -0.3437 0.2706 -0.4501**
(0.4446) (0.2590) (0.3308) (0.3836) (0.1861)
ROE 0.1015 0.1130 -0.0115 0.1739 -0.0609
(0.1662) (0.1700) (0.0448) (0.1172) (0.0641)
NPL -0.3519 -2.0079* 1.6560** -1.0517 -0.9562**
(0.8044) (1.1293) (0.6568) (1.0498) (0.4139)
Constant -0.0131 -0.0256 0.0125 -0.0348** 0.0092*
(0.0134) (0.0167) (0.0080) (0.0149) (0.0053)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 107 107 107 107 107
Adjusted R2 0.0774 0.0326 0.2012 0.1792 0.1426
The table reports results from the ordinary least squares regressions examining the changes
of bank liquidity creation as they enter the stress test group with changes in other observable
control variables included as independent variables. In all regressions, the first stress test is
excluded. All variables are measured as changes from quarter 3 of year t−1 to quarter 3 of year
t. The variable of interest is First Stress, which is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank is subject to
the stress test in a particular year but not the year before and 0 otherwise. Time fixed effects
are included in all regressions and robust standard errors reported in parentheses are double
clustered by bank and time. LC is the liquidity creation, LCON is the on-the balance sheet
liquidity creation measure, LCOFF is the off-balance sheet liquidity creation, LCA is the asset
component of liquidity creation, LCL is the liability component of liquidity creation, SIZE is the
natural logarithm of gross total assets, CAP is the equity to total assets, ROE is the return on
equity, and NPL is the total non-performing loans to total loans. ***, **, and * denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 8: Regressions of changes in bank liquidity creation around the stress test quarter
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LC LCON LCOFF LCA LCL
Stress × Q = t− 2 -0.0019 -0.0002 0.0021 0.0021* -0.0023
(0.0044) (0.0013) (0.0046) (0.0011) (0.0016)
Stress × Q = t− 1 -0.0074 -0.0015 -0.0060 0.0014 -0.0029
(0.0060) (0.0025) (0.0051) (0.0019) (0.0018)
Stress × Q = t -0.0125*** -0.0034*** -0.0091** -0.0034** -0.0000
(0.0047) (0.0013) (0.0043) (0.0014) (0.0019)
Stress × Q = t+ 1 -0.0105 -0.0090** -0.0015 -0.0064** -0.0026
(0.0068) (0.0040) (0.0075) (0.0027) (0.0027)
SIZE -0.3025*** -0.1457*** -0.1568* -0.1217*** -0.0240
(0.0990) (0.0285) (0.0952) (0.0310) (0.0213)
CAP 1.5130* -0.8317*** 2.3447** -0.3286 -0.5031***
(0.8857) (0.2114) (1.0258) (0.3073) (0.1318)
ROE -0.0035 0.0182 -0.0217 0.0127 0.0056
(0.0475) (0.0178) (0.0440) (0.0184) (0.0108)
NPL 0.1354 -0.1053 0.2406 -0.0437 -0.0615
(0.6869) (0.1945) (0.5775) (0.2457) (0.1771)
Constant -0.0169*** 0.0039 -0.0208*** -0.0027 0.0067***
(0.0045) (0.0029) (0.0033) (0.0024) (0.0016)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,156 1,156 1,156 1,156 1,156
Adjusted R2 0.1095 0.0492 0.1035 0.0554 0.0336
The table reports results from the ordinary least squares regressions examining the changes in measures of
bank liquidity creation around the stress tests (quarter 3 in 2009–2015 and quarter 1 in 2016) controlling
for changes in bank-specific independent variables. Stress is the dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the
bank is subject to the stress test in a particular year and 0 if it is not. The interaction term, Stress × Q
= t, isolates changes in the measures of liquidity creation in the stress test starting point quarter (changes
between quarter 2 and quarter 3 in 2009–2015 and between quarter 4 and quarter 1 in 2016). Stress × Q
= t+1 captures changes in quarter after the stress tests (between quarter 3 and quarter 4 in 2009–2015
and between quarter 1 and quarter 2 in 2016. Stress × Q = t−1 captures changes in quarter preceding the
stress tests (between quarter 1 and quarter 2 in 2009–2015 and between quarter 3 and quarter 4 in 2015)
and Stress × Q = t−1 isolates the changes in two quarters preceding the stress tests. All variables are
measured as changes from t−1 to t. Time fixed effects are included in all regressions and robust standard
errors reported in parentheses are double clustered by bank and time. LC is the liquidity creation, LCON
is the on-the balance sheet liquidity creation measure, LCOFF is the off-balance sheet liquidity creation,
LCA is the asset component of liquidity creation, LCL is the liability component of liquidity creation,
SIZE is the natural logarithm of gross total assets, CAP is the equity to total assets, ROE is the return
on equity, and NPL is the total non-performing loans to total loans. ***, **, and * denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 9: Regressions of changes in bank liquidity creation around the stress test quarter excluding
the first stress test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LC LCON LCOFF LCA LCL
Stress × Q = t− 2 0.0039 -0.0005 0.0044* 0.0015 -0.0020
(0.0027) (0.0016) (0.0025) (0.0014) (0.0017)
Stress × Q = t− 1 -0.0040 -0.0023 -0.0018 0.0012 -0.0034**
(0.0048) (0.0021) (0.0039) (0.0017) (0.0016)
Stress × Q = t -0.0080** -0.0023*** -0.0057 -0.0031** 0.0008
(0.0040) (0.0003) (0.0043) (0.0014) (0.0021)
Stress × Q = t+ 1 -0.0176*** -0.0066* -0.0110*** -0.0059** -0.0007
(0.0061) (0.0039) (0.0042) (0.0029) (0.0023)
SIZE -0.1944*** -0.1380*** -0.0564*** -0.1202*** -0.0179
(0.0341) (0.0329) (0.0155) (0.0332) (0.0233)
CAP -0.4595* -0.4621** 0.0026 0.1915 -0.6536***
(0.2723) (0.1898) (0.2289) (0.2549) (0.1339)
ROE -0.0043 0.0163 -0.0206 0.0113 0.0050
(0.0121) (0.0213) (0.0191) (0.0223) (0.0174)
NPL -0.0140 -0.2064 0.1924 -0.1085 -0.0979
(0.4645) (0.3342) (0.1949) (0.3180) (0.1803)
Constant 0.0064*** 0.0058*** 0.0006 -0.0018** 0.0076***
(0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046
Adjusted R2 0.0399 0.0469 0.0079 0.0761 0.0487
The table reports results from the ordinary least squares regressions examining the changes in measures of
bank liquidity creation around the stress tests (quarter 3 in 2011–2015 and quarter 1 in 2016) controlling
for changes in bank-specific independent variables. In all regressions, the first stress test is excluded. Stress
is the dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the bank is subject to the stress test in a particular year and
0 if it is not. The interaction term, Stress × Q = t, isolates changes in the measures of liquidity creation in
the stress test starting point quarter (changes between quarter 2 and quarter 3 in 2011–2015 and between
quarter 4 and quarter 1 in 2016). Stress × Q = t+1 captures changes in quarter after the stress tests
(between quarter 3 and quarter 4 in 2011–2015 and between quarter 1 and quarter 2 in 2016. Stress × Q =
t−1 captures changes in quarter preceding the stress tests (between quarter 1 and quarter 2 in 2011–2015
and between quarter 3 and quarter 4 in 2015) and Stress × Q = t−1 isolates the changes in two quarters
preceding the stress tests. All variables are measured as changes from t−1 to t. Time fixed effects are
included in all regressions and robust standard errors reported in parentheses are double clustered by
bank and time. LC is the liquidity creation, LCON is the on-the balance sheet liquidity creation measure,
LCOFF is the off-balance sheet liquidity creation, LCA is the asset component of liquidity creation, LCL
is the liability component of liquidity creation, SIZE is the natural logarithm of gross total assets, CAP is
the equity to total assets, ROE is the return on equity, and NPL is the total non-performing loans to total














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 11: Regression discontinuity estimation under local randomization
Statistic Control obs. Treatment obs.
LC -0.130*** 107 82
p-value (0.000)
95% Confidence interval [-0.211, -0.045]
LCON -0.018 107 82
p-value (0.576)
95% Confidence interval [-0.080 , 0.048]
LCOFF -0.112*** 107 82
p-value (0.000)
95% Confidence interval [-0.182, -0.038]
LCA -0.029 107 82
p-value (0.299)
95% Confidence interval [-0.084, 0.023]
LCL 0.011 107 82
p-value (0.517)
95% Confidence interval [-0.021, 0.042]
The table reports the effect of stress testing on measures of bank liquidity creation the under local
randomization inference following Cattaneo et al. (2015, 2016). Statistic is the difference-in-means estimate
between the treatment group and control group within a narrow bandwidth near the cutoffs where the
local randomization assumption is most plausible. LC is the liquidity creation, LCON is the on-the
balance sheet liquidity creation measure, LCOFF is the off-balance sheet liquidity creation, LCA is the
asset component of liquidity creation, and LCL is the liability component of liquidity creation. ***, **,
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 12: Falsification tests for estimated effect using different cutoff values
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
LC LC LCON LCON LCOFF LCOFF LCA LCA LCL LCL
Cutoff $40 billion -0.0731 -0.0381 -0.0567** -0.0234 0.0101 0.0076 -0.0148 -0.0133 -0.0212 0.0054
(0.0591) (0.0510) (0.0242) (0.0250) (0.0297) (0.0272) (0.0278) (0.0272) (0.0144) (0.0131)
Cutoff $60 billion 0.1576 0.1173* -0.0087 -0.0031 0.1527 0.1580* -0.0317** -0.0212* 0.0118 0.0148
(0.1162) (0.0670) (0.0228) (0.0213) (0.1071) (0.0901) (0.0140) (0.0124) (0.0128) (0.0120)
Cutoff $70 billion 0.2234 0.2310 0.0101 0.0077 0.2123 0.2740 -0.0081 -0.0028 0.0154 0.0106
(0.2324) (0.2259) (0.0283) (0.0315) (0.2553) (0.2544) (0.0171) (0.0180) (0.0150) (0.0156)
Cutoff $80 billion -0.2767 -0.3131 -0.0768 -0.0884 -0.1983 -0.2164 -0.0404 -0.0504 -0.0182 -0.0193
(0.2051) (0.2242) (0.0786) (0.0830) (0.1614) (0.1819) (0.0461) (0.0482) (0.0256) (0.0304)
Cutoff $90 billion -0.0732 -0.0456 0.0257 0.0463 -0.0889 -0.1274 -0.0039 0.0001 0.0061 0.0257*
(0.1174) (0.0860) (0.0420) (0.0478) (0.1034) (0.1023) (0.0182) (0.0213) (0.0127) (0.0146)
Cutoff $110 billion -0.0268 -0.0596 0.0125 -0.0338 -0.0168 -0.0168 -0.0016 -0.0235 -0.0314 0.0203
(0.0338) (0.0363) (0.0204) (0.0317) (0.0142) (0.0133) (0.0164) (0.0171) (0.0286) (0.0269)
Control variables NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
The table reports regression results for measures of bank liquidity creation using different cutoffs. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. LC
is the liquidity creation, LCON is the on-the balance sheet liquidity creation measure, LCOFF is the off-balance sheet liquidity creation, LCA is the asset


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Liquidity creation over time
The figure shows the dollar amount of total liquidity creation of stress test banks and non-stress test banks from
2006:Q1–2016:Q4. All dollar values are expressed in 2016 dollars. The solid line refers to stress test banks and the
dashed line represents non-stress test banks.
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Figure 2: Regression discontinuity estimation using bank size to assign the treatment group
(a) RD Plot: LC (b) RD Plot: LCON
(c) RD Plot: LCOFF (d) RD Plot: LCA
(e) RD Plot: LCL
The figure shows the regression discontinuity (RD) results using a non-parametric approach that estimates the change
in bank liquidity creation given that the bank is in the treatment group (stress test banks). The purpose is to show
whether there is discontinuity in banks’ measures of liquidity creation at the size cutoff ($100 billion or $50 million).
LC is the liquidity creation, LCON is the on-the balance sheet liquidity creation measure, LCOFF is the off-balance
sheet liquidity creation, LCA is the asset component of liquidity creation, and LCL is the liability component of
liquidity creation. Observations to the left (right) of the threshold belong to control group (treatment group).
47
Figure 3: Density distribution of the bank size distance from the stress test threshold
The figure shows the density of the running variable to test for the discontinuity in the running variable following
McCrary (2008). The x-axis represents the distance between the bank size and the threshold (Assignment) and the
y-axis represents the density of the running variable. The dots represent the density and the solid line depicts the




Table A1: Summary of the literature on the effects of stress tests on banks’ behaviors
Author(s) Stress tests Findings
Acharya et al. (2018)
SCAP &
CCAR
Those banks that are subject to the stress tests cut down their credit supply,
particularly to relatively risky borrowers, thereby bringing down credit risk.
Banks became safer in terms of capital ratios as well as risk-weighted asset ratios.
Berrospide & Edge (2019) CCAR
Stress tests reduce commercial and industrial and small business lending.
However, firms’ overall debt, investment spending, and employment are largely
unaffected.
Bindal et al. (2019) DFA
Banks that are right below the size threshold increase the likelihood of doing
acquisitions and the number of acquisitions.
Bordo & Duca (2018) DFA
The passage of the DFA has induced a reduction in banks’ lending to small
businesses.
Bouwman et al. (2018) DFA
Those banks that are near below certain thresholds have incentives to alter
their behaviors to avoid crossing the thresholds and incurring greater regulatory
costs. These behaviors include growing assets and credits more slowly and
charging higher interest rates on commercial loans.
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Table A1 continued
Calem et al. (2019) CCAR
The 2011 CCAR resulted in a decrease in the share of jumbo mortgage
originations of stress-test banks and the effect was more pronounced for weakly
capitalized banks.
Connolly (2018) SCAP
Stress-test banks shift their lending toward relatively safer firms after the
SCAP. Stress-test banks are found to be less likely to enter into new syndicated
loans after the first stress test, which led to a change in the composition of
syndicate members away from tested banks. However, the overall borrowing and
firm outcomes were not dramatically affected.
Cornett et al. (2018)
SCAP &
CCAR
A significant increase in capital ratios for stress-test banks at the starting
point of the tests but not for non-stress test banks is reported. Banks that are
subject to the stress tests also reduced their dividends considerably more than
non-stress test banks as they entered the tests. Stress-test banks have incentives
to spend on lobbying activities significantly more than non-stress test banks.
Cortés et al. (2019) CCAR
An increase in interest rates and a reduction in credit supply to small businesses
is documented. The loan portfolios of stress-test banks are also rebalanced away
from riskier borrowers. Small non-stress test banks increased their market share,






Stress test banks reduce lending to small businesses, which negatively affects
entrepreneurship and innovation by young firms.




Eurozone banks shrank their assets, particularly securities in anticipation of
stricter supervision and the CA program. A decline in loan supply is found for
only banks with low levels of capital.




Stress-test banks reduce their risk-weighted assets including loans to both
corporate and retail customers instead of raising their levels of equity to increase
capital ratios.
Kovner & Van Tassel (2018) DFA
Banks’ cost of capital has fallen after the passage of the DFA, implying a
decrease in banks’ systematic risk.
Lambertini & Mukherjee (2016)
SCAP &
CCAR
Stress test failure resulted in higher loan spreads, pointing to the cost associated
with increased capital requirements.
Pierret & Steri (2018)
CCAR &
DFA
The CCAR exercises reduce excessive risk-taking by enhancing banks’ level of
supervision and highlight the importance of bank supervision that cannot be






To meet the capital requirements of the stress tests, banks restructured by
reducing their net loan charge-offs and increasing non-performing loans, leading
to increases in loan loss provisions and loan loss reserves.
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Table A2: List of stress test bank holding companies
2009 SCAP 2011 CCAR 2012 CCAR 2013 CCAR 2014 CCAR 2015 CCAR 2016 CCAR
Ally Financial Inc. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
American Express Company 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bancwest Corporation 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Bank of America Corporation 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bank Of New York Mellon Corporation 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
BB&T Corporation 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc. 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
BMO Financial Corp. 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Capital one Financial Corporation 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Citigroup Inc. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Comerica Incorporated 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Deutsche Bank Trust Corporation 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Discover Financial Services 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Fifth Third Bancorp 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
HSBC North America Holdings Inc. 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Huntington Bancshares Incorporated 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
JPMorgan Chase & Co. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Keycorp 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Metlife, Inc. 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
M&T Bank Corporation 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Morgan Stanley 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Northern Trust Corporation 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
RBS Citizens Financial Group, Inc. 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Regions Financial Corporation 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Santander Holdings USA 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
State Street Corporation 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Suntrust Banks, Inc. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
TD Group US Holdings 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
U.S. Bancorp 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
UnionBanCal Corporation 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Wells Fargo & Company 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Zions Bancorporation 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Total 19 19 19 18 30 31 33
The table reports the name of stress test bank holding companies (BHCs) with value 1 indicating that the BHC participated in a particular stress test and 0 otherwise.
UnionBanCal Corporation changed its name to MUFG Americas Holdings Corporation in 2014.
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